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THE LEGAL TENDER DECISIONS.'
THE judgments pronounced in the above cases are now the
law of the land, subject to the reconsideration of the Supreme
Court of the United States. As such they must await the final
determination of that tribunal. It is no part of the design of
this article to consider the authority of Congress to issue notes
and declare them a legal tender. That question has been exhausted by the ability brought to bear on either side. But the
reasons assigned for a judicial decision are sometimes more important than the point immediately adjudged. They enter into
the body of the law; and may have an unforeseen influence on the
course of judicial opinion. It is from this point of view that we
propose to notice some of the salient points of Bronson v. Bodes

and Hfepburn v. Griswold.
A promise to pay ten dollars, or any other given sum, lawful
money of the United States, may be regarded in three different
aspects. It may be viewed as a promise to pay the sum of $10as a promise to deliver ten pieces of metal, stamped at the mint
under the denomination of dollars-or as a promise for the delivery
of an amount of bullion corresponding to that which such dollars
would contain. Each of these interpretations is not only different
from, but inconsistent with, and exclusive of, the others. If the
meaning is that the sum of $10 shall be paid, the contract creates
I

Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229; Butler v. Horwitz, Id. 258; Hfepburn v.
Griswold, 8 Id. 603.
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a debt, which, like other debts, may be discharged in any lawful
money corresponding to the numerical amount of the obligation.
The kind of money in which the payment is made will be immaterial, if it is duly authorized by law. A gold eagle is, in this
aspect of the case, equivalent to ten silver dollars (see Cushing
v. WVells, 98 Mass. 550, 551), and these again to ten dollars
in gold; or the debtor may, if he thinks fit, tender the amount
in smaller coin; substituting two half dollars or ten dimes for a
dollar, subject to the limitation imposed by the Act of February
21st 1858.
On the other hand, if the contract is construed as a promise to
deliver ten silver coins of the denomination of a dollar, the obligation will not be a debt, but for the delivery of goods of a specific
kind. Half dollars, gold dollars or eagles, cannot be substituted
for silver dollars: Mervine v. Sailor, 5 Phila. R. 422, 488.
Whether dollars are or are not coined at the mint, the debtor
must procure them at his peril, or undergo the consequences of a
default. The creditor cannot maintain debt, but-must sue in
covenant or assumpsit, and call in a jury to assess the damages.
A judgment cannot be taken under the law of Pennsylvania for
want of an affidavit of defence. The very pieces for which the
obligee has stipulated must be given, and nothing else. This
results, not less from the import, than from the form of such an
obligation. If the dollars are wanted to complete a series of
coins, a gold dollar or two half dollars will not supply the place of
a silver dollar. If they are wanted for exportation to a foreign
country, as, for instance, China, it may well be that coin of a
greater or less denomination than a dollar will not answer the
purpose. This was notoriously the case in former years, when
the trade with that country was transacted chiefly in dollars.
But there is a third aspect of the contract, under which it may
be viewed as a promise for the delivery of an amount of bullion
corresponding to a dollar: Bronson v. Bodes, 7 Wall. 229, 250.
If so interpreted, and the contract speaks of silver money, gold
cannot be substituted, but two half dollars may, for the purposes
of the contract, be equivalent to a dollar. Bullion may, moreover, obviously be substituted for coin, because the subject of the
contract is not money in either sense of the word, but a given
weight of metal.
If the bullion is of the given standard, it need not be pure or
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refined; Bronson v. Rodes, supra, although the judgment in this
case may be thought to err in overlooking the distinction between
this class of contracts and that first above described.
Whether the amount of alloy should be fixed or follow the
variations of the coinage, is a more difficult question; but if the
contract were for silver dollars, gold bullion obviously would not
be a fulfilment of the contract.
There can be no doubt as to which of these interpretations
should be put on a contract payable in lawful money of the
United States. A promise to give a dollar is not in common
acceptation, or in the legal sense of the term, a promise to give
a specific coin. It may be fulfilled by the delivery of two half
dollars or of ten dimes. Nor is it a promise to deliver an amount
of gold or silver corresponding to that which the dollar contains.
The promissee may demand money and refuse to receive bullion.
It is a contract to pay the sum of one dollar in lawful money; and
whatever legally constitutes that sum at the time when the payment is made will be a performance of the contract. The law
has long been established on this basis; and if the decisions are
not more numerous, it is simply because the point has been
regarded as too obvious to be called in question.
The doctrine has been more than once exemplified in the financial history of the United States. The weight of the gold eagle
was reduced by the Act of February 21st 1853, from 270 grains
to 258, and the value diminished in a corresponding ratio; and
yet no one thought of contending that eagles coined after the
passage of the act were not a legal tender for all subsequent'
debts. This result was the more remarkable because the statute
was not worded retroactively except in containing a provision
that the gold and silver coins issued previously "should continue
to be legal tenders on the same terms as if they were of the new
coinage" which the act established. The loss to the debtor was
obviously considerable, amounting to nearly one dollar out of
every twenty-two; and the silence of the reports may be regarded
as conclusive that the point was not thought tenable by the courts
or the profession. Such is also the well-recognised rule in England, where, throughout changes that have been made in the coinage either by the king or Parliament, it has always been conceded
that in determining whether money is a lawful tender, regard
must be had to the time of payment, and not to that when the
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contract was made. The only instance to be found in the books
is the case of Mixed Money8, Davies' R. 50, where a bond conditioned for the payment of 1001. sterling was held to be payable
in the debased coin which Queen Elizabeth had made a legal
tender during the interval. General acquiescence in a matter
that concerns every man is the strongest proof that can be given
of public sentiment in countries where the courts and press are
free. Accordingly, it cannot be surprising that when the question arose in our own time under the recent Acts of Congress,
the decisions should have been uniform, with one singular exception, that if Congress were authorized to issue paper currency
and make it a legal tender, debts contracted on a specie basis
might be paid in paper. The law was so held ina series of cases
which will be found reported in 2 P. F. Smith 9, where all the
judges would seem to have concurred in the opinion that to know
in what money a debt should be paid, we must consider what the
currency is when the payment is made, and not what it was when
the debt was contracted. "I do not perceive," said STRONG, J.,
"cany force in the objection that the Act of Congress impairs the obligation of private contracts. The objection is not founded in fact.
It assumes at its start false premises. It assumes that an engagement to pay money is the assumption of an obligation to pay the
kind of money recognised by law when the engagement was undertaken, or, if not that kind, money of equal intrinsic value in the
market. But this is a mistaken meaning given to the contract.
A promise to pay money made before February 25th 1862 was
not a promise to pay gold or silver, much less a promise to pay a
weight of gold or silver then defined. If there is anything settled,
it is that a contract to pay money is satisfied according to its
meaning by the payment of that which is money when the payment is made. I refer for this to Davies's Rep. 28; Barrington
v. Potter, Dyer 81 b. folio 67; United States v. Bobertson, 5
Peters 644; Taw v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch 20. No one ever
thought that a debt of $1000, contracted before 1834, could not
be paid by 104 eagles coined after that year, though they contained no more gold than 94 eagles, such as existed when the
debt was made. Every contract is necessarily subject to the power
of the government, whatever that may be, over the currency, and
the obligations of the parties are undertaken with reference to
that power."
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Instead of contracting for money, in the ordinary and legal
sense of the term, the parties may, however, obviously contract for
specific coins, and if apt words are used to manifest such a design,
full effect will be given to it by the law. The intention must,
however, appear, and will not be inferred from terms which, like
dollars, sovereigns, and shillings, &c., in their ordinary acceptation, signify money, although capable of being used in another
sense, . because such an interpretation would tend, in the great
majority of instances, to defeat the true object of the contract.
A man who promises to give ten dollars for a hat, does not by so
doing bind himself to give ten coins of that denomination, but
simply to give ten dollars in any lawful coin. A promise to pay
ten gold dollars is within the same principle. Even if the adjective gold excluded silver, the purchaser would still be at liberty to
tender an eagle instead of the dollars which the contract literally
requires, showing that -whatthe parties have in view is money and
not coin: Swllenberger v. .Brinton,2 P. F. Smith 9. Nor will it
make any difference, under the decisions in Pennsylvania, that the
contract prescribes the weight of the dollars in which the payment
is to be made. In Aervine v. Sailor, 5 Phila. R. 422, 2 P. F.
Smith 9, the promise was to pay $570 lawful money of the United
States, each dollar weighing 17 pennyweights and 6 grains at least,
but the court held that the payment might be made in gold dollars
or silver dollars, weighing 17 pennyweights 12 grains, or in the
treasury notes of the United States, or," in short, in any money
which was legally equivalent to the $570 mentioned in the contract. The same rule was applied to a certificate of deposit of
"gold payable in like funds with interest," and to a note promising to pay a sum certain, but marked in the margin "$14,145
specie." In like manner, in John8on v. lcars, 1 Duvall (Ky.
Rep.), the court held that a promise to pay $420 in gold or silver,
was a promise to pay 420 dollars, and that the judgment must
follow the promise and be generally for dollars.
The cases in Massachusetts are not less strong in the same
direction. In Woods v. Bullens, 6 Allen 516, the suit was on a
"promise to pay five hundred dollars on demand, payable in
specie." The plaintiff contended that five hundred dollars in
specie meant five hundred specie dollars, and that he was entitled
to judgment for the amount which such dollars would have brought
if exposed for sale when the note fell due. CHAPMAN, J., in
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delivering the opinion of the court, observed, that this contention
assumed that the specie stipulated for was to be regarded as merchandise and not as money. If it was regarded as money, it was
itself the standard of value, and the allegation that one dollar
was not equivalent to another was absurd. A silver dollar might
be worth more or less in the market than a dollar in gold, but the
courts were by law to treat them as money and of equal value.
The court had no power to enter a specific judgment, but only
for a sum certain in dollars and cents. It was said, in like manner, in Bush v. Baldrey, 11 Allen 369; that whether the money,
which the defendant had received to the plaintiff's use, was paid
to him in gold or notes, he was only answerable for the numerical
amount in legal currency. The coined dollar of- gold being fixed
by law as of the value of a dollar, could not be treated by a
judicial tribunal as being of different value. These decisions
were cited and approved in Cushing v. Wills, 98 Mass. 550, and
such has been the general current of decision: Whetstone v. Colley,
36 Ill. 328; Buchegger v. Shultz, 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 95; 13
Mich. 420.
It is on the other hand equally well settled that when the
parties contract for coin of a particular kind or denomination,
and not for money, the very thing stipulated for must be furnished: Sears v. Dewing, 14 Allen 413; Cushing v. Wills, 98
Mass. 550. If the contract is for foreign coin it must be procured
and delivered; if for domestic coin of a particular year, that and
no other will answer the purpose. A promise to deliver a dollar
coined in the year 1810 cannot be satisfied by the delivery of a
dollar coined in any other year. So, if the contract is for silver
dollars of a certain weight and fineness, these and not gold dollars
or half dollars, although of the same nominal or actual value,
must be supplied under the contract. It will make no matter
that dollars of the kind in question are no longer coined and
cannot be procured in the market, because the obligor takes the
burden of the contract on himself, and must fulfil it at his peril.
Accordingly in The Christ Church Hospital v. Puechsel, 2 P.
F. Smith 71, the court held that a covenant to pay 32 Spanish
milled dollars could not be fulfilled by a tender of anything but
the very coin for which the covenant stipulated; and a similar
decision was made in Mather v. Kinike, 1 P. F. Smith-425, with
reference to a covenant to pay 21 Spanish pieces of eight. The
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principle was stated with admirable clearness by SHARSWOOD, J.,
in Mervine v. tSailor, 5 Phila. Rep. 422; although the circumstances did not require the application of the principle. A breach
of covenant is not excused by the difficulty or impossibility of
performance. This was vihdicated as a fundamental rule by the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Dermott v. Jones, 2
Wall. 1, and is equally applicable whether the promise is to
build a house or to furnish coin. When, however, the words of a
contract admit of two interpretations, the parties may fairly be
presumed to have intended that which may be fulfilled in the
usual course of business. A man may promise to deliver a coin
which the government has ceased to issue, or a coin such as no
government has ever issued, and must then submit to the consequences of his own folly or inadvertence. But such an interpretation should not be put on the contract if the words reasonably
admit of a different meaning. If the parties intend to stipulate
for bullion it is easy to say so in language that cannot be misunderstood. The promise may be in terms to deliver so many
pounds, ounces, or pennyweights of gold or silver. And so if
the intention is to stipulate for the coinage of a particular year,
or for coin equal in weight or fineness to such a coinage. But
the use of the word dollar primdfacze imports not coin but money, and an intention to use-it in any other sense should not be
presumed unless the meaning is clear. Otherwise a man, who
intends to stipulate for the delivery of that which with adequate
means can always be procured, may find himself bound by an
onerous obligation that cannot be fulfilled. The question, however, is one purely of intention, and if that can be ascertained,
there is no doubt as to the principle.
In -Dutton v. railaret,2 P. F. Smith 109, the bond sued on
was conditioned for the payment of "$3000, gold coin of the
United States, of the present weight and fineness." Here the
words "present weight and fineness" clearly indicated such
gold coin as the United States then issued, to the exclusion of
money in any other form. The contract, therefore, was for coin,
not money; and the court held that it could not be fulfilled by a
tender of notes, or of any coin not answering to the description
in the bond.
It is equally well established on general principles that the
damages for the breach of a contract, payable in specific
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coin, are to be assessed not in the coin which the defendant
agreed to give, but generally for what the coin was worth in
lawful money at the time when it was to have been delivered:
Henderson v. Me.Pike, 85 Mo. 255; Mathser v. Kinike, 1 P. F.
Smith 425; Dutton v. Pailaret,. 2 Id. 109. In Matser v.
-Kidke,WOODWARD, C. J., said that contracts for specific articles
were, if not performed, to be compensated in the currency of the
country, according to the value of the articles stipulated for. A
contract to' "pay 21 Spanish dollars or pieces of eight, each
piece of eight weighing 17 pennyweights 6 grains, or so much
lawful money of the province of Pennsylvania as shall from time
to time be sufficient to purchase 21 such pieces of eight, was as
much a contract for a commodity as if it had been for wheat or
ingots of gold or silver." Judgment was accordingly given for
the value of the Spanish dollars in the legal tender notes of the
United States.
It was said in like manner, in -Essex County v. Pacific Hills,
14 Allen 389, that when rent was payable in silver of a certain
fineness, the value of it should be estimated in treasury notes,
because these notes are the most common currency in use and
most easily procured, and by which it is to be presumed that the
debtor will satisfy the judgment. So in Sears v. Dewing, 14
Allen 413, which was an action to recover rent due upon a lease,
in which the lessee agreed to pay "the yearly rent of 4 ounces,
2 pennyweights and 12 grains of pure gold in coined money,"
a majority of the court held, that though the gold was by the
terms of the contract to be paid in the form of money, yet the
contract regarded it as a commodity, and judgment was entered
for the value of the gold in treasury notes. For a like reason the
judgment on a note payable in gold, ought not to be for gold but
for dollars generally, without specifying the kind: Buchegger v.
Shultz, 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 95; 13 Mich. 420.
When, however, the question arose in Bronson v. Rodes,
7 Wall. 229, a different conclusion was reached, and one for which
there is seemingly no precedent. The suit was on a bond conditioned for the payment of $1400 in gold and silver coin, lawful
money of the United States. The amount was tendered in
United States notes and refused by the obligee. Satisfaction
was thereupon entered upon the mortgage accompanying the
bond by the Supreme Court of New York, and their decree
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A writ of error was then
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The counsel for the appellant contended that there were in
fact four legal tender dollars of different values, 1st. The gold
coin coined since 1834 of the value of 100 cents, or 100ths of
such dollars. 2d. The gold coin coined before 1834 of the value
of 106 of such cents. 3d. The existing silver dollar of the value
of 103 of such cents. 4th. The treasury note dollar which in
December 1868 was worth 75 of such cents.
If the obligor had contracted to deliver 100 gold dollars of the
coinage prior to 1834, he could not have discharged the obligation by the tender of 100 gold dollars of the present coinage,
unless there was some positive law compelling the court to regard
things essentially of unequal value as equal for the purposes of
payment. For a like reason he should not be allowed to discharge an agreement to pay 1000 specie dollars by the tender of
1000 paper notes worth only three-fourths of their numerical
amount in coin. One question to be determined under these
circumstances was, whether the law declaring treasury notes to
be lawful money, and a legal tender for the payment of all debts,
public and private, was designed to render paper dollars legally
e~uivalent to specie, and an adequate performance of a contract
expressly stipulating for payment in coin.
It was obvious that Congress had no such design, and that the
act in question did not operate to prevent parties from binding
themselves hy an express agreement to pay in a metallic currency
as distinguished from paper.
It was said on behalf of.the defendant in error that if the bond
under consideration had been for the delivery of 1400 gold dollars, and not as it was in fact to pay $1400 in gold or silver coin,
it would not have created a debt in the sense either of the common
law or of the statute, making treasury notes a legal tender. Such
an obligation would regard dollars, not as currency but as articles
of traffic or commodities. It could only be performed by the
actual delivery of the number and kind of dollars specified in the
bond, and the damages in case of non-performance would be the
value of such dollars as estimated in legal currency at the time
when the breach occurred. But it was contended that the obligation before the court was to pay a sum certain in lawful money
of the United States, and that the words gold and silver coin
VOL. XI.-6
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should either be rejected as inconsistent with the tenor of the
contract, or viewed as merely descriptive of that which the law
would have implied, to wit, that payment was to be made in the
metallic currency, which was then the only one.
Chief Justice CHASE said, in delivering judgment, that the
legal import of the phrase "dollars payable in gold and silver
coin lawful money of the United States," might be ascertained
without much difficulty. Every such dollar was a piece of gold
or silver certified to be of a given weight and purity by the form
and impress given to it at the mint of the United States, and
therefore declared to be a legal tender. Any number of such
dollars was the number of grains of stahdard gold or silver in
one dollar multiplied by the given number. A. contract to pay a
certain number of gold or silver coins, was therefore an agreement to deliver a certain weight of standard gold, to be ascertained by a count of coins, each of which was certified to contain
a definite portion of that weight. It was not distinguishable in
principle from an agreement to deliver an equal weight of bullion
of equal fineness. It was distinguishable in circumstance only
by the fact that the sufficiency of the amount to be tendered in
payment must be ascertained in the case of bullion by assay and
the scales, while in the case of coins it might be ascertained by
count. This construction gave effect to the intention of the parties. Their intent was that the debtor should deliver to the
creditor a certain number of gold and silver coins of a certain
fineness ascertained by count of coins made legal tender by
statute. If paper dollars were a valid tender under such a contract it could only be by the force of the statute. Taking the
statute in connection with the general course of legislation on the
subject of the currency, it did not require or even admit of a
construction that would invalidate express contracts for payment
in coin. Duties on imports must be paid in coin, and interest on
the public debt in the absence of other provisions must also be
paid in coin. An argument was not needed to prove that these
positive requirements could not be complied with if contracts
between individuals to pay coin dollars could be satisfied by offers
to pay their nominal equivalent in note dollars. The merchant
who agrees to pay in coin must contract for the coin which he
requires. The bank which receives coin from him on deposit
contracts to repay it on demand. The messenger who is sent to
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the bank or custom-house is under an obligation to pay or deliver
the coin according to his instructions. These were all contracts
either express or implied to pay coin. It was plain that duties
could not be paid in coin if such contracts could not be enforced.
The result was that contracts for the payment of coin dollars
could only be satisfied by the payment of coin dollars. They
were not debts which could be satisfied by the tender of United
States notes.
It remained to determine what judgment should be entered
upon a contract for payment in coin. It had been taken for
granted that payment could only be made in one description of
money. But the Act of 1792 provided, "that the money of
account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars, dimes,
cents, and mills, and that all accounts in public offices and all
proceedings in the courts of the United States shall be kept and
had in conformity with these regulations."
This regulation was part of the first coinage act, and had reference to the coins provided for by it. It was, however, a general
regulation relating to all accounts and all judicial proceedings.
As therefore, two descriptions of money were sanctioned by law,
both expressed in dollars and both made current in payments, it
was necessary in order to prevent ambiguity and prevent a failure
of justice, to regard the regulation as applicable alike to both.
When the contract in suit was payable in coin the judgment
should be entered in coin dollars and parts of dollars. When the
contract was payable in dollars generally, without specifying to
what description of currency it referred, judgment was to be
entered generally without such specification.
Mr. Justice MILLER dissented from the opinion of the court on
the ground that an agreement to pay a given sum of dollars in
gold and silver dollars lawful money of the United States was a
debt in the common acceptation of the term, and within the meaning of the act by which the notes of the United States were
declared to be lawful money and a legal tender for all debts public and private. The specification of the kind of money in which
the payment was to be made merely expressed what the law would
have implied at the time the contract was made. It did not therefore control the legal effect of the word dollar as the unit of value
established by law.
The argument of the Chief Justice in Bronson v. Bodes is
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not new, and contains nothing that will not generally be conceded. It follows the line of thought which had been drawn by
Judge SHARSWOOD with equal clearness, in Mervine v. Sailor,
5 Phila. Rep. 422, 432. The authorities agree that a covenant
to pay specific coin is not a debt but an obligation of a very
different kind. It is, in the language of the Chief Justice, "an
agreement to deliver a certain weight of standard gold, to be
ascertained by a count of coins, and is distinguishable from an
ordinary contract for the delivery of bullion only in the method
by which the sufficiency of the tender is to be ascertained." The
debtor may, if he thinks proper, substitute ingots of gold or silver
for coin, and require the weight and fineness to be tested by assay
and the scales.
The Act of July 11th 1862 obviously does not apply to such
a contract or render it invalid. It relates exclusively to debts,
and a contract to deliver bullion is not a debt but an agreement
to furnish merchandise of a particular kind. The anomaly of
Bronson v. Bodes is not the reasoning of the court, but the conclusion ultimately deduced in giving judgment. Decrees for
specific performance are nearly if not quite unknown to the common law. The redress afforded in actions ex contractu is an order
not that the contract shall be fulfilled, but that the plaintiff shall
have compensation in damages for the breach. The contract may
be for the delivery of grain, but the judgment is not on that
account for grain, but for as much money as the grain would have
been worth at the time and place appointed for the fulfilment of
the contract. The judgment on a contract for Spanish dollars
follows the same rule, and is not for dollars but for the value
which the dollars would have had if delivered according to the
agreement. There is nothing in a contract for domestic coin to
exempt it from this principle or require an anomalous judgment
for the things or class of things contracted for. A court of
equity may compel the specific execution of a contract for the
conveyance of land, but such a decree is seldom, if ever, made
where the agreement relates to chattels. The reasons for this
bourse are obvious, and apply with peculiar force at law where
judgments are enforced by converting the property of the defendant into that which he has been adjudged to owe. If, for instance,
a judgment were rendered against him for wheat, his goods would
be sold to the bidder who would give the greatest number of
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bushels of wheat, and when the judgment is for bullion or specific
coin, the execution must follow and enforce the judgment for bullion or specie. If the reasoning of the Chief Justice is sound, a
contract payable in lawful silver money of the United States
entitles the promissee to a judgment for silver dollars, which, as
we have seen, are worth 3 per cent. more than gold. Such dollars are rarely coined at the mint, and could not be obtained in
sufficient numbers to satisfy an execution for a large amount. :The
inconvenience that might result is obvious, because it would be
the duty of the sheriff to give effect to the mandate of the court,
and refuse any bid that was not made in silver. The debtor
might, it is true, tender bullion as equivalent to coin. But there
are many parts of this country where it would be difficult, if not
impracticable, to procure a large quantity of silver in any form
within the time allowed for the levy and return of a fieri facia8;
and if an execution can be issued exclusively for silver, the property of the debtor may be sold for much less than it is worth,
and bought in by a rapacious creditor notwithstanding the presence of bidders who are ready and willing to give full value for
it in the currency established by law, and the only one accessible
to men engaged in the ordinary operations of business. A forced
sale is a severe but necessary means of administering justice.
The hardship would be real if the debtor were cut off from the
ordinary means of payment, and compelled to satisfy the writ in
specific coin or chattels. The rule of the common law that judgments shall be general for as much lawful money as will compensate the plaintiff is not less humane than just, and we may doubt
the wisdom of the departure from it in Bronson v. Bodes.
These remarks apply with equal force to the case of Butler v.
Hforwitz. In that case the suit was on a lease for ninety-nine
years executed in the year 1791, and containing the following
covenant, "yielding and paying therefor the yearly rent or sum
of 151. current money of Maryland, payable in English golden
guineas weighing 5 pennyweights and 6 grains, and other gold
and silver at their present established rate and weight according
to the Act of Assembly." The contract here was clearly for bullion payable in foreign or other coin at the established rate and
value according to the law of Maryland as then existing.
The court below gave judgment for $59.71, being the value of
the rent as estimated in the legal tender currency of the United
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States. When, however, the question came before the Supreme
Court of the United States, that tribunal held that whether the
contract be for foreign or domestic coin it equally entitles the
creditor to an amount of bullion of the stipulated weight and
fineness. The damages should therefore be assessed in lawful
gold and silver money of the United States, agreeably to the rule
laid down in Bronson v. Rodes. The judgment was therefore
reversed, and judgment entered in accordance with this principle.
In these instances the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act
was taken for granted, and the turning point of the decision was
the nature of the contract as entitling the plaintiff to bullion in
the shape of coin. The obligation of the defendant was said not
to be a debt in the ordinary acceptation of the torm or within the
meaning of the statute. In the subsequent case of Hepburn v.
Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, the suit was on a promise to pay "$1000
lawful money of the United States." It was therefore a debt, and
was held to be such by the court. Yet the judgment was the
same, to wit, for gold and silver coin. We may therefore infer
that in the opinion of the Chief Justice there is no real distinction
between a contract payable in lawful money of the United States
and in foreign coin; each being for a given weight of gold or
silver, equalling the number of grains of bullion in each coin,
multiplied by the whole number of coins contracted for. If this
view is sound, a specie dollar of the present coinage is not a legal
tender for a debt incurred prior to the year 1834. A promise to
pay a sum certain in lawful money of the United States, may be
satisfied in any coins which by law make up that sum; but the
United States have no more power over a contract for bullion
than they have over a contract to deliver wheat. Such a contract
is for merchandise, and depends on the law of the state where it
is made, or on the law of the state where it is to be performed.
The reason given in Bronson v. Bodes for entering a specific
judgment, can hardly be deemed sufficient. It is the Act of
1792, directing that the money of account of the United States
shall be expressed in dollars, dimes, cents, and mills, and that all
accounts in the public offices and all proceedings in the courts of
the United States shall be so kept. With all due submission, the
motive for laying down this rule seems to have been a different
one from that assigned by the Chief Justice. It was to correct
the inveterate habit of conducting pecuniary transactions in the
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depreciated currency which had prevailed under the confederation. Sales were made and accounts kept, not in dollars and
cents, but in pounds, shillings, and pence, having a different value
in every state. This practice continued down to our own times,
and the traces of it have not wholly disappeared: During the first
half of this century the Spanish real held its ground against the
dime, and was popularly designated in New York as a shilling, in
Pennsylvania as elevenpence or eleven-penny bit, and as nine pence
in Massachusetts. The purchaser who bought at retail in New
England was told the price in shillings, and an explanation might
be necessary to inform him that the vendor had reference to an
obsolete coin answering to seventeen cents of our money.
The source of the evil lay far back in the colonial history.
It is clearly indicated in the American Negotiator, published in
1761, and dedicated to "Samuel Lord Sandys, First Commissioner for trade and the plantations." "The currencies in the
colonies have fluctuated and varied so much that they have differed
greatly both as to time and place, seldom being the same in two
different provinces at a time, and often changing value in the
same place. In some of the provinces they have deviated so
much from sterling money in the way of reckoning their moneys,
and run to such a degree of depreciation, that two shillings sterling have become equal to one pound currency, or one pound
sterling equal to ten pound. At Boston, in New England, they
run on in a continual course of depreciation in the space of fortyseven years in an irregular progressive advance from 1381. currency for 1001. sterling to 11001. currency for 1001. sterling."
(Page 60). The General Court afforded a partial remedy by
cancelling the depreciated bills and issuing others for money
actually borrowed, after which the legal rate of exchange was
fixed at 1331. currency for 1001. sterling, while the Spanish dollar
was rated at six shillings. A Massachusetts shilling was consequently worth three-fourths of the English coin of the same
denomination. See Palfrey's Hist. of Mass., vol. 2, 403, 525.
Felt's Acct. of Mass. Currency 31, 45, 131. Similar causes
produced a like effect in the other colonies. A pound in Pennsylvania currency was estimated at $2.66 -, or but little more than
one-half the value of the pound sterling, and the depreciation
was somewhat greater in New York. The currency of Virginia
and Maryland stood higher than that of Pennsylvania, but the
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disorder reached its height in South Carolina, where 7001. currency were required to buy 1001. sterling.
A merchant in Philadelphia, who wished to consign goods to
Charleston and remit the proceeds to England, had to go through
an intricate and laborious calculation, and elaborate tables were
prepared to facilitate the process. (See the American Negotiator
42, 71.) It was a scene of monetary and financial disorder, which
continued under the confederacy, and did not close until after
the adoption of the Constitution. Men were slow to abandon the
method of computation in which they had been educated for the
decimal coinage established by Congress, and thought a-bad system, to which they were accustomed, preferable to the inconvenience incident to change.
The pound and shilling continued in general use as the money
of account until the close of the century. This was true not
only of private transactions, but of those which concerned the
public. The transition to dollars and cents took place in the
oflice of the Auditor-General of Pennsylvania in 1797, and seems
to have been longer delayed in some of the other states.
Congress might coin money, but could not make the use of it
compulsory, nor could they prevent the states or individuals from
keeping their accounts in the way they thought preferable. They
could, however, and did, require the pecuniary transactions of the
government to be conducted in the money established by law.
This was the object, and the only object, of the regulation of
1791. It had no reference to coin as such, or to the distinction
between coin and paper money. The meaning was that dollars,
dimes, cents, and mills, or, in other words, units, tenths, hundredths, and thousandths, should be substituted, where the United
States were concerned, for the heterogeneous currency which
filled the channels of trade. If the existing dollars were called
in and others issued, the regulation would apply equally to these,
and so if paper dollars were substituted for coin. The end in view
was uniformity, and not the diversity that must inevitably result
from the use of different standards of varying and unequal value.
Unquestionably when dues and customs are payable in specie
and so collected, the officer is under an obligation to pay over
what he receives, and should make a corresponding entry in his
books; but it does not follow that the damages are to be assessed
specifically in coin if the duty is not fulfilled. A judgment in
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1869 for $1000 in coin would have been an inadequate satisfaction for the misappropriation of a thousand gold or silver dollars
in the spring of 1864.
Such a rule would be alike injurious to the creditor and debtor,
as tempting the one to speculate on the fall of gold, and depriving the other of what he would have -made if the contract had
been punctually fulfilled. It is therefore difficult to believe, with
the Chief Justice, that, by the use of one and the same term,
two different standards of value were intended.
On turning to Hepburn v. Gr8wold, we shall find the divergence from the antecedent course of decision not less marked
than in Bronson v. Bodes. The court held that if the Act of
February 25th 1862 was constitutional for any purpose, it was
invalid with regard to antecedent contracts. To make the notes
of the United States a legal tender for a debt payable in specie
would impair the obligation of the contract, and was beyond the
power of Congress. The Chief Justice did not deny that the
obligation of a contract might be impaired through the operation
of the express powers of government. So much has to be conceded in view of the power to declare war, of the power to establish an uniform system of bankruptcy, of the power to coin money
and declare the value thereof. But he contended that when a
power not enumerated is made the means of executing an enumerated power, it must be consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. That spirit required' the government to maintain, 'not
destroy rights conferred by grant or contract. To compel the
creditor to accept less than the amount of the debt, or to compel
him to accept something which might bear the same name but was
in reality less valuable, was in effect to take private property without compensation, and not in the due course of law. Such an act
was therefore beyond the legislative power of Congress.
This distinction may be thought more plausible than sound.
Certainly Congress have not been authorized to impair the obligation of contracts. Such a head of power would be a novel one
under any form of government. Ordinarily, contracts are regulated by the law of the state where they are made, or the law
of the state where they are to be performed, and cannot be varied
or controlled by Congress. But the powers of the United States
may be carried into execution even when the effect is to impair
the obligation of a contract: Evans v. Baton, 1 Peters C. C. Rep.
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322; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 2 P. F. Smith 9, 70.

This is as

true of the general government as it would be of the states if

there were no prohibitory words. To hold that a measure designed
for the common good must fail because it conflicts with an agreemeat between individuals is contrary to the fundamental conception of government, and subversive of the end for which it is
established. Accordingly, no one would maintain that the operation of a certificate in bankruptcy is limited to. debts incurred
subsequently to the passage of the statute, or that a debt contracted prior to the year 1834 cannot be paid in current coin.
And yet the obligation is impaired retroactively in the one instance
and discharged altogether in the other. So an agreement in New
York to open a credit in London will be at an end if Congress
declare war against Great Britain. It may be said that these
are express powers. But when an implied power is a necessary
and proper means for the execution of an express power, it is as
much a part of the express power as if it were conferred in terms.
It is therefore settled, that a law may be valid although not
authorized expressly and tending to impair the obligation of a
contract. An embargo suspends, if it does not dissolve, a contract of charter or affreightment, yet the power of Congress to
lay an embargo is as well established as that it results by implication from the commercial power: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
The shipper may be ready to forward the goods, and the shipowner under a covenant to receive them, yet either party may
plead the statute as a justification for the non-fulfilment of the
contract. So the power to draft is not given expressly, and is a
mere inference from the power to raise and equip armies. The
conscript is obviously released from any obligation which he may
have incurred, to do work, devote his skill and labor to the manufacture of goods, or render a personal service of any other description. Yet this was not, so far as I am aware, made a ground of
objection in any of the ingenious forensic or judicial arguments
against the power.
The provision that private property shall not be taken without
compensation or the due course of law, seems equally irrelevant.
Every one will agree with the Chief Justice, that Congress
cannot declare that an agreement to deliver 100 bushels of wheat
may be fulfilled by a tender of 50 bushels.
The reason is,
that such contracts belong to the domain of the state legisla-
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tion, and are not ordinarily subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. When, however, the contract is drawn within
the power of Congress by the insolvency of the vendee; the
liability arising under it may be varied or extinguished through
the operation of a bankrupt law passed by Congress. This is
every day's experience, and yet no one thinks of contending that
a discharge in bankruptcy is invalid as taking private property
without compensation.
Contracts for the payment of money are by an exception to the
general rule subject to the authority of Congress, as it regards
the means of payment. This results not only from the power to
regulate the currency, but from the terms of every contract
which is expressly or by implication payable in the lawful money
of the United States.. Plainer language could not be found to
indicate the intention of the parties that payment shall be made
in such dollars as may be. lawful when the time arrives. These
may be of greater or of less value, or of a different material, and
yet within the terms of the agreement. The power of Congress
has accordingly been exercised in various instances in this sense
without encountering the objections made in Hfepburn v. Griswold.
In 1834, 6 per cent. was taken from the weight and value of
the gold dollar, and -the holders of all debts subjected to a
corresponding loss. In 1837 and 1853 the half dollar and
smaller silver coins underwent a similar reduction, through which
debts not exceeding five dollars lost one-tenth of their value.
Was this taking private property without compensation or due
process of law ? or could that effect be attributed to a law substituting platinum dollars for gold? or providing that the coinage
should be debased, by doubling the amount of alloy? If these
questions must be answered negatively, it cannot be contended
that issuing paper money and making it a legal tender is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. So a manufacturer may be
deprived of needful services by a draft, or a merchant ruined
through the operation of an embargo. The right may be secured
in either case by contract, and yet the case will not be within the
Fifth Amendment. This illustrates the difference between the
statutory abrogation of a contract and a law directed to another
end and operating incidentally on the contract. An act avoiding
a charter-party or contract for services, would clearly be invalid,
but a contract may as clearly be dissolved or varied through the
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operation of the commercial power or the power to declare war.
In like manner Congress could not provide that a contract for
one hundred dollars should be satisfied by seventy-five, but may
provide that each dollar shall contain 25 per cent. less gold.
I may here advert to another argument used in Hepburnv. Griswold, which concerns historical truth not less than the law. It was
alleged that an irredeemable paper currency is not a fit or useful
instrument for any purpose, and cannot therefore be a necessary
or proper means for executing the powers conferred on Congress.
This assumption is the hinge on which the judgment turned. We
might appeal on this head from the opinion of the Chief Justice
to the administration of the Secretary of the Treasury. Leaving
the argumentum ad hominem on one side, it is more material to observe that the case is not fully stated in the judgment of the court.
The choice was not between a redeemable and an irredeemable
paper currency, but between an irredeemable currency issued by
the government, and an irredeemable currency issued by the banks.
It was not conceivable that institutions which did not redeem
their notes during the war of 1812, and thrice suspended payment
between 1836 and 1857, could be adequate to the trial which the
country was about to undergo. The experience of England,
France and Austria, coincides with that of the United States, that
a paper currency cannot be maintained on a specie basis during a
great political and military crisis. Every thinking man knew
that gold and silver would disappear from circulation under the
pressure of the rebellion. The practical question was by what
means they should be replaced. A paper currency based on the
credit of the government was manifestly preferable to a paper
currency resting upon the credit of corporations created by the
states. We should in this way at least secure uniformity, and
avoid the embarrassment that had been occasioned in former years
by the unequal rates of exchange between the different sections
of the country. Whether the notes of the United States should
be made a legal tender was a more doubtful question on which
differently constituted minds cannot be expected to agree. But
it can hardly be said that the solution reached by Congress is
so clearly erroneous that a judge can properly declare it void.
If a power can be valid under any circumstances, the question
whether it is appropriate to the existing circumstances is political
not legal, and does not belong to the judicial province.
J. I. CLARK HARE.

